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Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial
Review under Title IV of the LMRDA: A
Proposal for Administrative Reform*
In 1959 Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA).' The goals of the Act were to guarantee
the political and civil rights of union members within their unions
and to make union officers more responsive to members' welfare. 2
Title IV of the Act established standards to ensure free and demo-
cratic union elections3 and empowered the Secretary of Labor to
bring suit to overturn elections upon a member's complaint that those
standards were breached.4 Congress made the Secretary's suit the
The author is grateful to the Labor Department for its generous cooperation and
assistance.
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970). The legislative history of the Act is gathered in U.S. SOLICITOR
OF THE DEP'T OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959: TITLES I-VI (1964) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For
discussion of the political background of the Act, see A. McADAMs, PowER AND POLITICS
IN LABOR LEGISLATION (1964).
2. LMRDA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). The Act was, in part, Congress's response to
the corrupt union practices uncovered by the Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Field. See A. MCADAMS, supra note 1, at 273
(crucial factor in passage of LMRDA was public reaction to labor corruption uncovered
by Select Committee); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960).
3. LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970). Section 401 requires that elections be held
at least once every three years for local union officers, at least once every four years for
officers of intermediate union bodies, and at least once every five years for officers of
national or international labor organizations. Election of all officers is by secret ballot
among members in good standing or (in non-local elections) by vote of a convention of
delegates chosen by secret ballot. Id. § 481(a), (b), (d). Section 401(c) prohibits discrim-
inatory use of membership lists and union distribution of campaign literature; it also
provides safeguards to ensure fair elections, including the right of any candidate to have
observers at the polls and at the ballot count. Id. § 481(c).
Any member in good standing is eligible to be a candidate and hold office (subject to
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed); each member in good standing must
receive notice of an election and is entitled to one vote. Id. § 481(e). Elections and con-
ventions must be conducted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the
union, insofar as those provisions are not inconsistent with the LMRDA. Id. § 481(e),
(f). Union funds may not be used to promote the candidacy of any person in an election
subject to Title IV. Id. § 481(g). If the Secretary of Labor determines that union
procedures for removal of officers are inadequate, he may conduct new elections. Id.
§ 481(h), (i). See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.1-.134 (1976) (Labor Department rules in-
terpreting § 401).
4. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970), outlines the procedure for enforcement
when violations have occurred. After a member has exhausted his internal union
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exclusive post-election remedy for election violations; union members
cannot bring private actions. 5
During the 1960s the Supreme Court recognized the Secretary's
broad authority to investigate complaints and bring suits in order to
guarantee union democracy.0 However, the individual interest of the
complaining union member was ignored by the courts7 until the
remedies (or has invoked those remedies without obtaining a final decision within three
months), he may, within one month, file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
alleging violation of § 401. Id. § 482(a). The Secretary shall investigate the complaint.
If he" finds probable cause to believe that a violation of LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481(1970), has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall bring suit against the union
within 60 days after receiving the initial complaint. Id. § 482(b). If the court finds that
an election has not been held with the frequency required by § 401 or that violations of§ 401 may have affected the outcome of the election, it shall void the election and
order the holding of a new election supervised by the Secretary. The Secretary shall
certify to the court the names of the persons elected in the rerun election, and the
court then shall enter a decree declaring those persons to be the officers of the labor
organization. Id. § 482(c).
5. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970).
6. In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a
union member cannot challenge allegedly discriminatory nomination rules in a suit
under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970), and that his sole remedy lies in a suit by the Secretary
under id. § 482(b). The Court explained that Congress vested the Secretary with ex-
clusive power to bring suit in order
to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order
best to serve the public interest. . . .Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is
in harmony with the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in
resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies
of Government most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a
settlement through discussion before resort to the courts.
379 U.S. at 140. See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 473
n.11 (1968) (Congress intended to confer "broad power" on Secretary); Wirtz v. Local
125, Laborers Int'l Union, 389 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1968) (Secretary's complaint not strictly
limited to member's original allegations because such limitation "would be inconsistent
with [the Secretary's] vital role . . . in protecting the public interest bound up in Title
IV" and because "[t]he expertise and resources of the Labor Department were surely
meant to have a broader play").
7. Despite the Supreme Court's confidence in the Department of Labor's enforcement
of Title IV, union dissidents from 1964 to 1971 claimed that the Secretary was unrespon-
sive to complainants and generally lax in filing and prosecuting Title IV suits. See, e.g.,
Hall, Introduction, in AUTOCRACY AND INSURGENCY IN ORGANIzED LABOR 1, 5-8 (B. Hall
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as AUTOCRACY] (discussing the need for democratic reform of
union leadership and viewing Department of Labor as obstacle to efforts of union
reformers).
As a result of their lack of confidence in the Secretary's handling of Title IV suits,
complainants went into court, seeking to control or challenge the Secretary's conduct of
such suits. However, courts refused to entertain the challenges, holding that the Secre-
tary's exclusive right to bring Title IV suits precluded private parties from objecting to
the Secretary's decisions. Complainants challenged the Secretary's decisions at each
stage of Title IV litigation: (1) Decisions not to Bring Suit: McArthy v. Wirtz, 65
L.R.R.M. 2411 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62 L.R.R.M. 2557 (D.D.C. 1966);
Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964). Cf. Orphan v. Hodgson, 78 L.R.R.M.
2825 (N.D. I1. 1971) (court has no jurisdiction to compel Secretary to investigate pre.
election violations). (2) Decisions to Accept Formal Consent Agreement with Defendant
Union: Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967)(denial of complainant intervention challenging stipulation between union and Secre-
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Supreme Court's decision in Trbovich v. UMW.8 There the Court
held that the Title IV complainant has a right to intervene in the
Secretary's suit.9 Trbovich prompted greater judicial recognition of
the complainant's rights. 10 Most recently, the Supreme Court held in
tary); Shultz v. Steelworkers Dist. 15, 312 F. Supp. 1044 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (similar). (3)
Decisions concerning the Formulation and Enforcement of Rules for Supervised Elec-
tion: Wirtz v. NMU, 409 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1969) (union member has no standing to
challenge' Secretary's rules). (4) Decisions to Certify Results of Supervised Election:
Morrissey v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court cannot entertain suit
against Secretary to compel new rerun election); Wirtz v. Local 1377, IBEW, 288 F.
Supp. 914 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (union member cannot intervene in Title IV suit to allege
irregularities in supervised election). In only two reported cases before 1972, both
involving review of the Secretary's decision not to bring suit, did courts allow private
parties to come into court to object to the Secretary's actions. But neither suit
ultimately rendered the relief sought by the complainants. See DeVito v. Shultz, 72
L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969); Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
8. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). The plaintiff was a union dissident seeking to intervene in a
Title IV suit against the Mine Workers, so that he could add allegations to the Secretary's
complaint, suggest specific rules to be enforced in the rerun election that would be
ordered if the Secretary won the suit, and present evidence and argumentation in support
of the Secretary's challenge to the 1969 election. Id. at 529-30. Underlying this motion
for intervention was deep dissatisfaction with the Secretary's enforcement of Title IV,
shared by Mine Worker reformers and their attorneys. See United Mine Workers' Election
1971: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare (Part II), 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6, 16, 24-25, 27-28, 30-32, 34-35, 60-61, 63 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as UMW Hearings If]; Feldman, Miners for Democracy, in AUTOCRACY,
supra note 7, at 11, 13-14, 17-18; Rauh, LMRDA-Enforce It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L. REv.
643, 651-58 (1971). See also Kalis, Private Litigation and the UMW, 3 YALE Rav. L. &
Soc. AcTioN 272 (1973) (describing other UMW dissident suits).
9. The Court acknowledged that Title IV was intended to protect unions from de-
centralized and frivolous litigation. The Court reasoned that intervention designed only
to assist the Secretary in proving his case and in formulating rules for the supervised
election would impose no additional burden on the union. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1972).
10. From 1972 to 1975, courts upheld the legal right of complainants to challenge the
Secretary's decisions at various stages of Title IV litigation:
(1) Decisions to Accept Formal Consent Agreement with Defendant Union: Brennan
v. District 50, Allied & Technical Workers, 499 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding
consent agreement); Brennan v. Steelworkers Dist. 15, Civ. No. 73-957A (W.D. Pa. Dec.
12, 1974) (same); Brennan v. Steelworkers Dist. 31, Civ. No. 73-957B (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2,
1974) (same, Aug. 23, 1974); Brennan v. Connecticut State UAW Community Action
Program Council, 373 F. Supp. 286 (D. Conn. 1974) (modifying consent agreement);
Hodgson v. Local 44, Upholsterers, Civ. No. 72-4600 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1974) (upholding
consent agreement, Feb. 6, 1974); Casey v. Brennan, No. C-73-0836 AVZ (N.D. Cal. Oct.
19, 1973) (unsuccessful mandamus action to compel Secretary to reject pre-complaint
consent agreement and bring suit).
(2) Decisions Concerning the Formulation and Enforcement of Rules for Supervised
Election: Bibbs v. Brennan, Civ. No. 74-1562 EC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1974) (intervenor's
successful challenge to exclusion from ballot in supervised election); Rollins v. UMW
(Brennan), Civ. No. 1753-73 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 1973) (unsuccessful mandamus action);
Hodgson v. UMW, 81 L.R.R.M. 2840 (D.D.C. 1972) (challenge to Secretary's rules). See
also Brennan v. UMW, 82 L.R.R.M. 2699 (D.D.C. 1973) (interpreting Hodgson v. UMW,
81 L.R.R.M. 2505 (D.D.C. 1972) (intervenor in Title III suit successfully challenging
Secretary's interpretation of rules for supervised election)).
(3) Decisions to Certify Results of Supervised Election: Hodgson v. Carpenters Resilient
Flooring Local 2212, 457 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1972) (intervention by defeated officer to
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Dunlop v. Bachowski11 that the Secretary's decision not to sue is sub-
ject to judicial review at the instance of the complainant.' 2
This Note argues that judicial review under Bachowski has been
unsatisfactory as a means of protecting individual rights and that the
ultimate solution lies with the Department of Labor or Congress. 13
The review process contravenes the statutory goals of Title IV's en-
forcement scheme and provides inadequate protection for the com-
plainant's interest in the suit. Indeed, the problem underlying the
Bachowski litigation is that the Labor Department's investigatory
process does not have rules and procedures necessary to ensure open-
ness, apparent fairness, and sufficient consideration of the com-
plainant's point of view. The Note proposes that Congress overrule
Bachowski by amending Title IV to preclude judicial review and that
judicial review be replaced by administrative procedures within the
Labor Department. The recommended procedures, providing for in-
formal hearing and review analogous to that used in NLRB cases,
would give complainants a more meaningful voice without impairing
the special enforcement goals of Title IV.
challenge Secretary's certification); Hodgson v. Local 44, Upholsterers, Civ. No. 72-4600
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1975) (intervenors' unsuccessful challenge to Secretary's certification of
election); Brennan v. Local 639, Teamsters, Civ. No. 1963-72 (D.D.C. June 24, 1974),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (same). But see Usery v. District 22, UMW, 93 L.R.R.M. 2364 (D. Utah 1976)
(intervention to challenge certification denied under Bachowski standard of review).
11. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). The plaintiff had narrowly lost a 1973 election in Steel-
workers District 20 and filed a timely complaint with the Secretary. The Secretary in-
vestigated the allegations and found that "civil action to set aside the challenged election
[was] not warranted." Id. at 563. The complainant brought suit in the Western District
of Pennsylvania, requesting the court to "declare the actions of the Defendant Secretary
to be arbitrary and capricious and order him to file suit to set aside the . . . election."
Id. at 564. For a discussion of the legal and factual background of the Bachowski case,
see Comment, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion under Title IV of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 After Dunlop v. Bachowski, 10 GA. L.
REV. 818 (1976).
12. Several lower courts had already reached this conclusion. See Bachowski v.
Brennan, 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (Secretary's decision not to sue subject to judicial review,
including factual inquiry into bases of Secretary's decision); Valenta v. Brennan, 90
L.R.R.M. 3313 (N.D. Ohio 1974), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977)
(same); DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969) (judicial review limited to
examination of Secretary's statement of reasons); Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Secretary's discretion reviewable by court). See also Hopson, Judicial
Review of the Secretary of Labor's Decision Not to Sue to Set Aside a Union Election
Under Title IV of the LMRDA, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1281, 1302-05 (1972) (pre-Bachowski
endorsement of judicial review of Secretary's decisions not to sue).
13. Scholarly commentary has noted and criticized Bachowski for its narrow scope of
review, but without carefully analyzing the case's impact on national labor policy. See
Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1975, 28 AD. L. REv. 131, 143-44 (1976); 17
B.C. INDUS. & Co.t. L. REv. 581 (1976); Address by Florian Bartosic, Convention of the
ABA's Labor Law Section (1975), reprinted in [1975] LABOR RELATIONS YEAmooK (BNA)
61, 69-70.
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I. Problems with Judicial Review under Bachowski
In vesting the Secretary with exclusive power to bring Title IV
suits, Congress's general goal was to provide an effective remedy for
violations of Title IV's election requirements, but with minimum
governmental interference in the affairs of labor unions.'4 Behind
this general goal of minimizing governmental interference are two
specific goals: to prevent frivolous and decentralized litigation against
unions' 5 and to settle quickly the cloud on officers' title when un-
meritorious challenges are made against the validity of elections.' 6
The role of the Secretary in Title IV litigation is primarily to protect
the "public interest"-the preservation of union democracy without
undue intrusion into union affairs. Yet Congress also intended the
Secretary to be the "lawyer" enforcing the complainant's right to free
and democratic elections in his union. 7 The Bachowski Court im-
plicitly recognized some conflict between the Secretary's broad power
and discretion and his duty to protect the complainant's interests; the
Court sought to reach a compromise between these competing con-
cerns.' 8
Specifically, Bachowski presented two questions: whether the
Secretary's decision not to bring a Title IV suit is subject to judicial
14. See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1968); S.
REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 24-25; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 118; A. McADA MS, supra note 1, at 98; Mitchell, Safeguards for
Union Democracy, in SYMPoslums ON LMRDA 135, 135-41 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961).
15. The Conference Committee which drafted the final version of the LMRDA
clearly intended the Secretary's suit to be the exclusive remedy for union election viola-
tions; the Committee rejected the House version, which authorized suits by union mem-
bers. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 34-35 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TiVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 835. This choice reflected Congress's fear that unions would
be afflicted with harassing and diffuse litigation unless some agency could centralize
litigation and screen out frivolous complaints. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,
569-70, 573 (1975); Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 532-36 (1972). See generally Labor-
Management Reform Legislation: Hearings on S.505, S.748, S.76, S.1002, S.1137, and S.1311
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. 135, 567, 578-79 (1959) (testimony reflecting unions' fear of frivolous
litigation).
16. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 569, 573 (1975); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.7 (1968). Congress intended that union election
challenges, unless warranted by the Secretary, should be disposed of quickly, so that
the union's officers would not be hampered in acting for the union and in bargaining
with employers.
17. 104 CONG. REC. 10947 (1958) (Sen. Kennedy, Senate sponsor of LMRDA). See
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975); Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1972).
18. But see 17 B.C. INDus. & Coat. L. REv. 581, 595, 598 n.143 (1976) (under principles
of administrative law, the Court's assumption that the Secretary's decision is not un-
reviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970) as "committed to agency discretion" is in
conflict with the Court's conclusion that the scope of review must be very narrow
because of the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary).
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review and, if so, what the proper scope of review should be.19 The
Supreme Court held the Secretary's decision reviewable, but limited
review to examination of the Secretary's statement of reasons for not
bringing suit, without investigation into the accuracy of the facts on
which his refusal was based.20 If the reviewing court finds the state-
ment rational on its face, the Secretary's decision will be upheld. If
the reviewing court finds the statement "so irrational as to constitute
the decision arbitrary and capricious,"21 the decision will be remanded
to the Secretary for a supplemental statement of reasons. The Supreme
Court reserved the question whether a court can compel the Secretary
to bring suit if supplemental statements remain unsatisfactory. 22
Bachowski was an attempt to achieve a compromise between com-
peting statutory goals, but in practice the compromise has failed to
realize either goal. Judicial review has contravened two of Title IV's
enforcement objectives: protection of unions from potentially frivolous
suits and speedy resolution of post-election controversies. Yet the scope
of review granted in Bachowski is so narrow that it affords scant
protection for the complainant's rights.
A. Impairment of the Enforcement Scheme
Title IV vests exclusive enforcement of post-election remedies with
the Secretary in order "to prevent members from pressing claims not
thought meritorious by the Secretary and from litigating in forums or
at times different from those chosen by the Secretary." 23 By screening
19. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1975).
20. Id. at 572-73. The scope of review extends beyond the reasons statement only in
the "rare case" where a plaintiff proves that the Secretary's decision is "'plainly beyond
the bounds of the Act [or] clearly defiant of the Act.'" Id. at 574 (quoting DeVito v.
Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2682 (D.D.C. 1969)). For example, "'if the Secretary prosecuted
complaints in a constitutionally discriminatory manner,'" a reviewing court might engage
in a factual inquiry. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.3, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560 (1975)).
21. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. at 575; see id. at 574-75 & n.11 (approving DeVito v.
Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969)).
22. Id. at 575-76.
23. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 536 (1972). The Trbovich Court was careful to
tailor the right of intervention narrowly to protect the congressional purpose. Further-
more, the Court limited the intervenor's role to the presentation of evidence in support
of the Secretary and participation in the formulation of rules for the supervised elec-
tion. Id. at 536-37. The Court held that the intervenor could add no new allegations to
the Secretary's complaint:
[Tjo require the union to respond to these claims would be to circumvent the
screening function assigned by statute to the Secretary. We recognize that it is less
burdensome for the union to respond to new claims in the context of the pending
suit than it would be to respond to a new and independent complaint. Nevertheless,
we think Congress intended to insulate the union from any complaint that did
not appear meritorious to both a complaining member and the Secretary.
Id. at 537.
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out frivolous complaints, the Secretary is meant to shield unions from
the hazards and expense of unnecessary litigation-publicity, harass-
ment, discovery, and attorneys' fees.24
Notwithstanding this express goal of Title IV, unions are frequently
defendants in suits for judicial review of the Secretary's decisions not
to bring suit. For instance, the Steelworkers union was a named de-
fendant in Dunlop v. Bachowski.2 5 Before the Supreme Court, the
Steelworkers argued that suits for judicial review necessarily involve
the union and that such litigation therefore defeats the Secretary's
screening function.2 6 The union's argument was unsuccessful; indeed,
it was entirely ignored by the Court.
However, it is clear that the Steelworkers' argument has merit. The
union has a strong interest in preventing the institution of a disrup-
tive Title IV suit and therefore understandably supports the Secre-
tary's decision not to sueY7 The interest is not simply the desire to
24. Congress is still committed to the policy of protecting unions from harassing
litigation. See note 70 infra. Cf. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COM-
NwUNTY 90-91 (1970) (arguing that proper labor policy should not overemphasize "pure"
elective democracy in unions to the disruption of the efficient functioning of the union
as a bargaining organization). For example, complainants may attempt to use the
judicial process to embarrass unions and their leadership. See, e.g., Intervenors' Memo-
randum in Opposition to Entry of Judgment at 7-9, Brennan v. Connecticut State UANV
Community Action Program Council, 373 F. Supp. 286 (D. Conn. 1974) (Trbovich in-
tervenor using power to take depositions to bring in issues of official malfeasance and
to embarrass union and officials); Motion for Order Granting Leave to Intervene,
Affidavit of John J. Balistreri (complainant seeking to intervene in Title IV suit to ask
the court "to dissolve the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union as being an unlawful
syndicate of organized crime") & Declaration of Joseph C. Burton in Opposition to
Motion for Permission to Intervene (noting that intervenor's attorney had brought nine
frivolous suits against defendant union, alleging damages totaling $202,338,853), Brennan
v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, No. 73-1143 SC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1974).
25. Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub noin. Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Brief for the United Steelworkers of America at 7,
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
26. See Brief for Petitioners at 21, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975):
The union could be (as it was in this case) named as a defendant in the suit
nominally against the Secretary; it could thus be "haled into court, virtually without
limitation" [Labor-Managemnent Reform Legislation: Hearings on S.505, S.748, S.76,
S.1002, S.1137, and S.1311 Before the Subconmu. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 567 (1959) (statement of Andrew
Biemiller, AFL-CIO)]. And, even if not named a defendant in the complaint, the
union would need to defend the suit as an intervenor or amicus since it, as well as
the Secretary, is a real party in interest; if the Secretary is ordered to commence a
Title IV suit, the union must defend its election.
Respondent answered this argument unconvincingly: "At any rate, the primary burden
of defending the litigation would be on the Secretary of Labor." Brief for Respondent at
18, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
27. If the complainant is successful and the Secretary brings the Title IV suit, the
union must suffer the expense of defending the validity of its election and, sometimes, its
established procedures for conducting elections. Cf. Krulikowsky v. Metropolitan Dist.
Council of Philadelphia, 270 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (national labor union
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avoid the expense and risks of litigation. The legal remedy demanded
by Bachowski plaintiffs will generally require that suit be brought
after the statutory limitations period of 60 days (from the date of the
original complaint) has elapsed. 28 Since the 60-day limitation period
was established for the protection of the union and its officers, the
complainant's remedy necessarily involves a statutory right of the
union-either the union must waive the limitation or the court must
find equitable grounds for extending the period.29 Moreover, the
union may be prejudiced in the subsequent trial by certain judicial
rulings on issues of law and fact if the reviewing court rejects the
Secretary's reasons as "arbitrary and capricious" and the Secretary then
brings suit.30
Unions have frequently been involved as defendants in suits for
judicial review of the Secretary's decisions not to sue. On at least one
occasion, the union has intervened as a party defendant. 3' More
significantly, complainants have brought unions into suits for judicial
review as named defendants.32 Though no union has yet tried to
indispensable party, because plaintiff LMRDA suit challenges section of union's constitu-
tion). Moreover, the union's interest is not adequately protected by the Secretary. Cf.
Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1972) (main duty of Secretary is to protect
public interest).
28. See, e.g., Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nora.
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (plaintiff requesting court, as part of relief, to
"direct the Secretary . . . to reach an agreement with the union extending the period of
time for filing suit to set aside [the] election").
29. See Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113, 1118-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828
(1971). See generally notes 33 8. 34 infra.
30. See, e.g., Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (V.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545
F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976). On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court
invalidated the method used by the Secretary to assess the degree to which certain
violations "may have affected the outcome" of elections where the violations are purely
technical. Since the court in a Title IV suit (the same court as that which reviews the
Secretary's decision not to sue) must overturn the election if violations "may have af-
fected [its] outcome,"'29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1970), this novel judicial determination could
be highly prejudicial to the union if the Secretary were ultimately to bring suit.
31. Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3313, 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed,
No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977) (United Steelworkers intervening as defendant).
32. For cases before Bachowski in which unions were named defendants, see the
complaints filed in Bibbs v. Brennan, No. 74-1562 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1974); Casey v.
Brennan, No. 73-0836 AVZ (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1973); Rollins v. UMW (Brennan), No.
1753-73 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 1973); Feltman v. Brennan, No. 73-4823 S (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5,
1973). See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT & REPORTING IN 1969
UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 63 (describing un-
reported case in which complainant sued both union and Secretary to invalidate stipulated
settlement of Title IV suit); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 32 (1965)
(describing unreported case in which complainant sued both union and Secretary to
enjoin violations of LMRDA and to compel filing of Title IV suit).
For cases filed or decided after Bachowski in which unions have been named de-
fendants, see the complaints filed in Nichols v. Usery, No. 3-76-1007 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
1977); Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d
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withdraw from these suits, it might be precluded from doing so be-
cause it is a "person needed for just adjudication" under Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
A second major goal of Title IV was to avoid protracted govern-
mental investigation into internal union affairs. This prompted the
requirement that the Secretary bring suit against the union within 60
days of the filing of the member's complaint with the Labor Depart-
363 (3d Cir. 1976); Hamada v. Secretary of Labor, No. 76-0011 (D. Hawaii Feb. 2, 1976);
Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1450
(7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976); Rohs v. Usery, No. 77-102 (E.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1977). It
appears that Bachowski plaintiffs sometimes bring unions into the suit as named de-
fendants because they fear that the unions improperly influence the Secretary's decision.
See Motion to Vacate Judgment, Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(alleging an agreement whereby the union promised to forego a nationwide railway
strike in return for the Secretary's promise not to bring suit); Bachowski v. Brennan, 405
F. Supp. 1227, 1233-34 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (alleging that the "real" reason behind Secretary's
decision not to sue was that "the Labor Department plays 'footsie' with the labor
establishment to the disadvantage of 'rebels' such as plaintiff").
Although no court has yet explicitly addressed the issue, the courts' authority to join
unions as defendants probably rests on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, for there
is no independent statutory basis for jurisdiction over defendant unions. See Fraser,
Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May Be Impaired If
Not Joined, 62 F.R.D. 483, 485-87 (1974) (ancillary jurisdiction embraces parties joined
under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i)); Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277-79 (D.
Ariz. 1973) ("Ancillary jurisdiction is the broader concept allowing a court to acquire
control of an entire controversy-both the claims and the additional parties-where it
has no independent jurisdiction over one er more parties.") Plaintiffs, moreover, can
obtain effective service of process on both union defendants and the Secretary despite
the narrow language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970). Cf. Powelton Civic Home Owners
Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("[T]he requirement [of § 1391(e)]
that 'each defendant' be a federal defendant refers only to defendants who are beyond
the forum's territorial limits." (emphasis in original)); Scott v. Parham, 69 F.R.D. 324,
327-28 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (following Powelton).
33. See, e.g., Local 329, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. South Ad. 8- Gulf Coast Dist.,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 295 F. Supp. 599, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (even when plaintiff
and defendant agreed to dismiss defendant from suit, court refused, holding that
"[u]nder Rule 19(a) . . . a court must order the joinder of certain designated persons
if joinder is feasible"). There are at least two bases for finding the union to be a person
needed for just adjudication under FED. R. Civ. P. 19. First, in the union's absence,
"complete relief" cannot be guaranteed the complainant within the meaning of FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The complete relief in a Bachowski suit is the bringing of the Title IV
suit by the Secretary, Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976); but the Secre-
tary cannot bring suit after the 60-day limitation period unless the union waives its
statutory rights. See note 34 infra; Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113, 1119 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). If the union refuses to waive its statutory rights (a natural
reaction), the court would either have to dismiss the suit or adjudge the 60-day limit
tolled by the Secretary's errors. But it is improper to consider the latter course unless
the court joins the union so that the union can present objections and defend its unique
interest in the limitation period. Cf. Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970)
(court mandating joinder of new defendants in order to broaden the range of possible
remedies and to ensure efficacy of remedies, despite defendant's objections). Second, a
Bachowski plaintiff can join the union under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i) by showing
that the union's absence from the suit may "as a practical matter impair or impede
[the union's] ability to protect that interest." See Fraser, supra note 32, at 485-86.
("Thus, a person who could but fails to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) can be made a
party to the action against his will under Rule 19(a)(2)(i).") See also notes 27 & 30 supra.
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ment.34 The purpose of this limitation period, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Bachowski, was to effect "expeditious resolution of post-
election dispute"35 and " 'to settle as quickly as practicable the cloud
on incumbents [sic] title to office.' "36 That is, if the Secretary finds
no actionable violations, intrusion into union affairs does not extend
beyond a two-month period.37
Judicial review has contravened this statutory goal simply because
judicial review takes so long. Before Bachowski, several courts had
reviewed the Secretary's decisions not to sue, invoking a scope of review
similar to that which Bachowski prescribed. Even this minimal level
of judicial scrutiny required seven to 21 months.38 Most actions seek-
34. LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970). Senator Kennedy, the Senate sponsor
of the Act, intended to set up a rigorous time schedule for the processing of election
complaints, believing that "time is of the essence" in resolving post-election disputes. S.
REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1958), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 701. The bill as introduced in 1958 required the Secretary to file suit within
30 days of receiving the complaint. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302(b) (1958). Debate in
the Senate considered a more flexible provision. Finally, a compromise amendment was
accepted, by which the limitation period was extended to 60 days. See 104 CONG. REc.
11003, 11182 (1958) (Sens. Smith & Kennedy), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 710-11.
Courts have allowed the Secretary to bring suit after the expiration of the 60-day
period if the union voluntarily agrees to an extension. Such extensions are granted in
many cases where the Secretary finds actionable violations in order that the union and
Secretary might negotiate an out-of-court settlement agreement. Hodgson v. Lodge 851,
IAM, 454 F.2d 545, 551-53 (7th Cir. 1971); Hodgson v. IPPA, 440 F.2d 1113 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); see Note, Waivers of the LMRDA § 402(b) 60-Day Time
Limit: When Must the Secretary of Labor Sue to Set Aside a Union Election?, 1971
DUKE L.J. 1199. Courts have also tolled the 60-day limitation period when the union has
obstructed the Secretary's investigation. Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck Builders
Union, 490 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Local 610, United Elec., Radio &
Machine Workers, 342 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Since the 60-day limitation
period is largely a protection for the union, its benefits may be fairly waived by the
union's consent or unlawful obstruction.
Congress's concern for speedy resolution of post-election disputes is also evident in the
requirement that the union member file his complaint with the Secretary within one
month of exhausting union remedies or within four months of lodging his complaint
with the union, whichever is shorter. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970). The
rationale for this provision is plain: "Since time is of the essence, no complaint may be
entertained which is filed [after the statutory period]." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1959), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 778 (emphasis added).
35. 421 U.S. at 575.
36. Id. at 573.
37. Even if the Secretary finds actionable violations, the two-month limitation period
protects the union by giving it early notice of the suit and an opportunity to remedy the
violations voluntarily. However, it must be noted that once actionable violations are
found, unions frequently agree to extensions beyond the statutory period in order to
pursue negotiations with the Secretary. See Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA:
Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 573 (1972) (Appendix D) (average
suit filed seven months after the challenged election, despite fact that exhaustion of
internal remedies and 60-day limitation period usually require only four to six months).
38. See Devito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969), described in U.S. DEP'T or
LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT & REPORTING IN 1970 UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
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ing judicial review that have been filed or decided since Bachowski 9
have been equally time-consuming. Several cases have lasted more than
a year; after four years Bachowski itself is still tied up in the courts.40
There are several reasons for this lengthy review process. District
courts' dockets are crowded.41 Once begun, such suits often involve
time-consuming litigation over complainants' discovery rights.42 If the
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 59-60 (lapse of seven months between commencement of
suit and final dismissal of complaint); Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
described in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT & REPORTING IN 1968 UNDER
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT 48 (lapse of 21 months). See also
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT & REPORTING IN 1969 UNDER THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr 63 (lapse of 19 months in unreported
case).
39. Only three cases decided under Bachowski have been reported: Bachowski v.
Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976)
(holding Secretary's supplemented reasons statement "arbitrary and capricious" and
remanding to Secretary for further consideration); Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113
(N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1450 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976) (complaint dis-
missed, finding Secretary's statement of reasons not arbitrary on its face); Valenta v.
Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3313, 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1977) (complaint dismissed because Secretary's reasons statement, though
unresponsive to complainant's objections, not arbitrary on its face). Unreported cases
include the following: Nichols v. Usery, Civ. No. 3-76-1007 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 1977) (com-
plaint dismissed); Woodall v. Usery, Civ. No. 3-76-271 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 1976) (same);
Riggi v. Department of Labor, Civ. No. 75-1922 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1976) (same); Dennis v.
Secretary of Labor, Civ. No. 76-898 (D. Md. June 25, 1976) (dismissed on motion of
petitioner); Rancich v. Secretary of Labor, Civ. No. 76-784 S (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 1976)
(dismissed); Hamada v. Secretary of Labor, Civ. No. 76-0011 (D. Hawaii Feb. 2, 1976)
(stipulation for dismissal with prejudice); Dycus v. Dunlop, No. 75-2873 IH (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 1976) (complaint dismissed); Keller v. Brennan, Civ. No. 74-327 (M.D. La. Dec.
20, 1975) (same). At least two cases are still pending: Rohs v. Usery, Civ. No. 77-102
(E.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1977) (no action as of May 1977); Fennelly v. Dunlop, Civ. No.
75-1764 F (D. Mass., filed May 5, 1975) lengthy discovery litigation).
40. A schedule of the cases filed or decided after Bachowski, see note 39 supra, is as
follows:
DATE OF FILING ACTION FINAL DISPOSITION OF CASE
SUIT SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW (AS OF MAY 1977)
Robs Jan. 17, 1977 None
Fennelly May 5, 1975 None
Bachowski Nov. 8, 1973 None
Valenta Jan. 7, 1974 Appeal Dismissed, Feb. 24, 1977
Nichols July 29, 1976 Dismissed, Jan. 13, 1977
Woodall Aug. 20, 1976 Dismissed, Dec. 10, 1976
Riggi Nov. 10, 1975 Dismissed, Oct. 5, 1976
Fletcher Sept. 15, 1975 Appeal Dismissed, Sept. 24, 1976
Dennis June 15, 1976 Dismissed, June 25, 1976
Rancich Apr. 26, 1976 Dismissed, Apr. 29, 1976
Hamada Jan. 15, 1976 Dismissed, Feb. 2, 1976
Dycus Aug. 26, 1975 Dismissed, Jan. 16, 1976
Keller Dec. 2, 1974 Dismissed, Dec. 20, 1975
41. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WVECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSrEM 49-55 (2d ed. 1973).
42. For example, consider the history to date of Fennelly v. Dunlop, Civ. No. 75-1764 F
(D. Mass., filed May 5, 1975):
July 3, 1975 - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
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reviewing court asks the Secretary for a supplemental statement of
reasons, a further delay of several months ensues. 43 Finally, since the
standards of review set forth in Bachowski are not fully defined and
since the reviewing court is a district court, complainants sometimes
appeal adverse decisions. 4
B. Inadequate Protection for Complainant's Interest
The Supreme Court in Bachowski held that the reviewing court
must confine its scrutiny to the Secretary's statement of reasons for
declining to sue, inasmuch as a de novo factual inquiry would con-
travene the objectives of Title IV. 4 5 Because this scope of review is
so narrow, because there is some question whether the reviewing
court can compel the Secretary to bring suit, and because Title IV
litigation entails special time pressures, judicial review under Bachow-
ski has been little better for complainants than no review at all. 46
July 21, 1975 - Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents
Aug. 20, 1975 - Defendant's Motion for Protective Order
Sept. 4, 1975 - Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order
Sept. 11, 1975 - Protective Order Granted by Court
No further formal action has been taken on this case as of May 1977.
43. The' timetable of filings in Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3316 (N.D. Ohio
1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977), is suggestive:
Jan. 7, 1974- Plaintiff files complaint for judicial review of Secretary's failure to bring
suit.
July 3, 1974- Court directs Secretary to file a more complete statement of reasons.
Aug. 1, 1974 - Secretary files supplemental statement.
Jan. 23, 1975 - Court directs Secretary to respond to further questions.
June 19, 1975 - Court orders Secretary to file another supplemental statement.
July 29, 1975- Secretary files supplemental statement.
Nov. 11, 1975 - Court reluctantly accepts Secretary's reasons under Bachowski.
Bachowski is another case in which the litigation has dragged on owing to the need for
supplemental statements of reasons. The case was remanded to the district court in 1975.
On December 19, 1975, the court demanded a supplemental reasons statement, which
the Secretary filed on March 30, 1976. On May 7, 1976, the court remanded to the
Secretary to recalculate the effects of the violations on the outcome of the election.
Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The Secretary appealed the
court's order remanding the case, but the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal because
the order was not "final." Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976). Plaintiff then
filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court. On February 4, 1977, the
Secretary filed an opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court
has not yet ruled on the plaintiff's motion.
44. Plaintiffs appealed district court dismissals in Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M.
2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1450 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976); and Valenta v.
Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir.
Feb. 24, 1977).
45. See p. 890 supra.
46. There are three possible advantages to judicial review under Bachowski, though
they seem insubstantial in practice. The lBachowski Court argued that requiring a reasons
statement subject to judicial review "promotes thought by the Secretary and compels
him to cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies." 421 U.S. at 572. But ef.
Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122
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Review under Bachowski is inadequate because the Labor Depart-
ment's statement of reasons, drawn up after a decision is made and
sometimes supplemented in court, is a "record" that is insufficient for
meaningful review under the narrow "arbitrary and capricious"
test.4 7 The statement of reasons the Secretary presents to the reviewing
court is potentially self-serving and generally conclusory. 48 Absent a
full administrative record, with opportunity for interested parties to
present their evidence and views, limited judicial review can be no
more than a formality; courts should be reluctant to give their im-
primatur to agency decisions supported only by the agency's own
factual conclusions.4 9 Similarly, the complainant seeking judicial re-
(6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977) (court dissatisfied with the Secretary's failure to be responsive to
complainant's assertions but affirmed his decision under Bachowski). Second, judicial
review might stimulate the Labor Department to adopt new procedures to give com-
plainants a chance to present their point of view. Most convincing is the argument that
the reviewing court can examine standards of law applied by the Secretary. See, e.g.,
Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d 363
(3d Cir. 1976) (overturning Secretary's method of computing effect that violations of right
to secret ballot may have had on the outcome of the election). However, because most
complaints after Bachowshi have raised purely factual issues, see note 50 infra, this
function of judicial review is of limited significance. Moreover, the judicial decisions in
Title IV trials and judicial review of departmental rulemaking provides a judicial check
on the Secretary's interpretations of Title IV.
47. Courts have found that there can be no meaningful review of informal decisions
unless the decision is supported by a formal agency record, a thorough explanation of
the decision by the agency, or an in-depth inquiry by the court. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 420 (1972) (review must be based on the
"full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision"); D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); National Rifle Ass'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 407 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D.D.C. 1976) ("IT]he court cannot properly apply a limited
standard of review of administrative decisions without the assurance of an impartial and
thorough-going review by the administrative decisionmaker, with a record that reflects a
full opportunity for interested parties to present their evidence, and to rebut unfavorable
evidence introduced by the agency.")
48. The statement of reasons in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 578-90 (1975),
summarizes the election violations and the number of votes that may have been affected
by each violation. The statement is conclusory in that the facts alleged are not accom-
panied by documentary evidence to indicate the sources of the Secretary's factual con-
clusions. Moreover, the statement fails to state reasons why the Secretary rejected many
of the allegations posited in Bachowski's original complaint. Cf. Valenta v. Brennan, 90
L.R.R.M. 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977)
(criticizing Secretary's supplemental statements as unresponsive to complainant's objec-
tions, yet affirming Secretary's decision pursuant to Bachowski). By ignoring the com-
plainant's factual queries and tailoring factual findings to the final decision, the
Secretary could inadvertently evade review altogether.
49. When judicial review is limited to examination of an agency's decision for "abuse
of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious" action, the reviewing court generally will
look only at the agency record. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). However,
when the agency's procedures are inadequate to establish a record suitable for judicial
review, the court should remand to the agency for a more complete record. See, e.g.,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1972); Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1976); National Rifle
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view fails to receive a meaningful hearing for his grievance unless the
court has before it a full record disclosing the grounds for the agency's
decision, as well as the arguments rejected by the agency. Indeed, most
plaintiffs have pressed preeminently factual challenges, which are
beyond Bachowski's narrow scope of review. 50
The cases for judicial review that have been brought or decided
since Bachowski51 illustrate the practical inadequacy of this narrow
scope of review. The suits establish the following pattern: The union
member files a complaint alleging that the Secretary relied on in-
accurate facts or refused to sue for improper reasons. The Secretary
asserts that the violations did not affect the outcome of the election
and that his reasons, as reflected in his written statement, are rational.
The complainant files motions for discovery, and the Secretary files
a motion for a protective order. All parties file motions for summary
judgment. The court ultimately (sometimes after obtaining a supple-
mental statement from the Secretary) dismisses the suit, and the com-
plainant sometimes appeals. In three major cases plaintiffs presented
colorable factual arguments, only to have the court dismiss the com-
plaint because the Secretary's statement of reasons was not irrational
on its face.52 In Valenta v. Brennan,53 for example, the reviewing court
demanded supplemental reasons in the face of the complainant's ex-
tensive rebuttal of the factual bases of the Secretary's first statement.
Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 407 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D.D.C. 1976). See McCormack,
The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?, 52 TEx. L.
REv. 1257, 1258, 1301-02 (1974); Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator:
Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure
Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUm. L. REV. 721 (1975).
50. That is, complainants and the Secretary mainly disagree, not on points of law,
but on findings of fact. Complainants in the three reported cases decided under
Bachowski raised mainly factual questions. See Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3316
(N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977) (conflicting
evidence whether certain violations occurred); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113
(N.D. Il1. 1975) (alleging that Secretary failed to investigate violations noted in original
complaint); Bachowski v. Brennan, 405 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff alleged
improper motivation of Secretary and the Department's failure to consider all relevant
evidence).
51. See note 39 supra.
52. See Dycus v. Dunlop, No. 75-2873 IH (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976); Fletcher v. Dunlop,
91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1450 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976);
Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M. 3313, 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No.
76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977). Cf. Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (applying Bachowski standard of review to uphold Secretary's certification of
rerun election, despite factual issues raised by intervenors); Usery v. Dist. 22, UMW, 93
L.R.R.M. 2364 (D. Utah 1976) (similar).
53. 90 L.R.R.M. 3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb.
24, 1977).
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The court remained dissatisfied with the revised set of reasons but
felt powerless under Bachowski to do more:
[T]he court is not permitted to resolve the conflict between the
Secretary's findings and plaintiff's conflicting and plausible state-
ments, even though the Secretary fails to address himself to some
points raised by Valenta that on this record seem to warrant
analysis.... On the present record the plaintiff has not proved
that the Secretary is acting arbitrarily .... But the failure of the
Secretary to challenge these statements is disturbing."
In only one of the post-Bachowski cases has a reviewing court found
the Secretary's statement of reasons "so irrational as to be arbitrary
and capricious." This was the district court in Bachowski itself, which,
on remand from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, invalidated
the Secretary's method of computing the effects of election violations
as internally inconsistent. This decision, resting on narrow and ques-
tionable legal grounds, is exceptional.55 In general, the heavy judicial
54. Id. at 3323. In Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dis-
missed, No. 76-1450 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976), the court entered summary judgment in favor
of the Secretary and the union, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2113-14, despite the plaintiff's contentions
that the Secretary misinterpreted the union's constitution and failed to investigate ma-
terial violations alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-4, Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M.
2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
What internal union remedies exist to challenge a union election and whether a
grievant has exhausted these remedies that do exist are matters of simple fact. The
Secretary of Labor has no special knowledge and discretion with respect to their
determination. The Court can and should make its own independent findings of fact
on these issues and not merely review the Secretary's findings to determine if they
are arbitrary and capricious.
Motion to Vacate Judgment at 3, Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. 111. 1975).
Cf. Bibbs v. Brennan, No. 74-1562 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1974) (finding dear error of fact in
Secretary's interpretation of union constitution and reversing Secretary's decision con-
cerning rules of election rerun under Title IV).
55. In so doing, the court may have evinced some restiveness with the Supreme
Court's decision by applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in a somewhat
unorthodox manner. In calculating the effect that violations may have had on the out-
come of the election, the Secretary distinguished between "cases where the number of
votes affected can be ascertained with some certainty, and cases where it can not."
Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d
363 (3d Cir. 1976). The Secretary explained that with violations of the latter type,
"it is impossible to prove one way or the other if any voters were actually intimidated
by such violations." Id. The Secretary reasonably concluded that it would be illogical
to say that these violations may have affected the outcome of the election with the
same probability as the violations "when the impact on such votes was directly af-
fected by a violation and the number of such votes could be measured with some cer-
tainty." Id. Moreover, the Secretary noted that "substantive violations of a type which
may affect how a voter votes are to be distinguished from merely technical violations of
a procedural character." Id. at 150 (emphasis in original). However, the court rejected
the Secretary's distinction in this case and remanded to the Secretary to recalculate the
effect that the violations may have had on the outcome of the election. Id. at 151.
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presumption in favor of the Secretary's decision and the lack of any
factual investigation have foreclosed meaningful judicial scrutiny of
the Secretary's statement of reasons. Such foreshortened judicial review
affords meager recognition of the complainants' actual objections.
The second limitation inherent in judicial review under Bachowski
is that a reviewing court which finds the Secretary's reasons arbitrary
can do no more than remand for additional reasons. Although the
Bachowski Court purported to leave open the question whether the
reviewing court can compel the Secretary to bring suit, 50 such com-
pulsion appears clearly beyond the judicial power as a matter of
statutory and constitutional law. First, such judicial coercion would
conflict with the statutory scheme. Courts have repeatedly recognized
Congress's reliance on the "special knowledge and discretion" of the
Labor Department in making decisions to bring Title IV actions."
The Bachowski Court explicitly held that the reviewing court is "not
authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of the Secretary
not to bring suit."58 Yet the Court only conceded that the congres-
sional reliance on the Secretary's discretion "presents some difficulty"
for the view that suit may be compelled.59 At least one circuit court
Despite the Secretary's reasonable explanation for his method of computation, the court
substituted its own judgment for that of the Secretary, seemingly contrary to the
Supreme Court's admonition in Bachowski. 421 U.S. at 575.
Another court has suggested even greater willingness to go beyond Bachowski and ex-
pand the role of the reviewing court. In Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 379
(D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C. Circuit suggested (in dictum) that
where the Secretary's statement on its face indicates a rationally based decision the
court's task is at an end, unless the challenger makes a specific factual proffer of
irregularity, in which event the burden of persuasion shifts to the Secretary to provide
further supplementation (the ultimate burden of proof resting with the challenger).
This conclusion seems contrary to Bachowski's holding that "review beyond the confines
of the reasons statement" would be justified only where the Secretary's decision is
"'plainly beyond the bounds of the Act [or] clearly defiant of the Act.'" 421 U.S. at 574
(quoting DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2682 (D.D.C. 1969)).
56. 421 U.S. at 575-76. But see id. at 592 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming that
Court's logic answered "reserved" question in affirmative). The Court assumed that the
Secretary would "act appropriately" if a court overturned his reasons for not bringing
suit. However, there are occasions where the Secretary would be forced to defy the court
and refuse to bring suit even when the court overturned his statement of reasons. See,
e.g., Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1976) (suggesting that Secretary
could get review of interlocutory district court rulings by refusing to bring suit and
appealing any order compelling suit).
57. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964) (emphasis added); see note 6 supra.
58. 421 U.S. at 571.
59. Id. at 575. See Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1925);
Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308, 334-36, 348-49
(1967). Since the Secretary's statutory discretion is limited by the Constitution and the
LMRDA, a different question is whether courts can enjoin agencies from following un-
lawful rules or regulations. See Davis Associates, Inc. v. Secretary of HUD, 498 F.2d 385,
389 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1974); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Vol. 86: 885, 1977
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has clearly disapproved judicial compulsion of suit as violating the
goals of Title IV.6O In light of the discretion vested in the Secretary
by Title IV, this conclusion appears correct.
Second, compelling suit would violate principles of separation of
powers. Article II vests the power to "execute" the laws in the Execu-
tive Department, not the federal judiciary.61 Cases considering judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion have repeatedly distinguished be-
tween legitimate judicial review setting forth the limits of agency dis-
cretion and invalid judicial usurpation of executive decisionmaking
functions. 62 Such judicial decisionmaking would be especially prob-
60. Howard v. Hodgson, 490 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2. One recent case illustrates the principle that Article III
courts cannot perform Article II functions under the guise of judicial review. In Billiteri
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 400 F. Supp. 402, 409 (W.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d
938 (2d Cir. 1976), the district court issued an order compelling the Parole Board to
release a prisoner on parole, because the Board's reasons for refusing to do so were
"arbitrary and capricious." See also Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp.
1217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (reversing arbitrary decision reached by Board and remanding to
Board for further consideration). The Second Circuit reversed and vacated the order:
"As a statutory court, the United States District Court had no power to conduct such a
[parole) proceeding and issue such an order. Congress has vested in the sound discretion
of the Parole Board the sole power to grant or deny parole." Billiteri v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). Billiteri is especially suggestive in a Title
IV context, for the district court in Billiteri was operating under a standard of judicial
review that permits factual inquiry. Cf. Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (reviewing court should not compel Executive Department to prosecute particular
cases).
62. See, e.g., Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cited in Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 576 (1975) (holding prosecutorial decisions reviewable but deny-
ing plaintiffs standing in instant case). The circuit court noted that the complaint did
"not ask the court to assume the essentially Executive function of deciding whether a
particular alleged violator should be prosecuted." Id. at 679.
To mandamus a particular prosecution, a court would have to determine that no
legitimate consideration informed the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute the indi-
vidual in question. Such a determination would normally be very difficult, for a
prosecutor may lawfully take account of many factors other than probable cause in
making such decisions .... That the balancing of these permissible factors in indi-
vidual cases is an executive, rather than a judicial, function follows from the need
to keep the courts as neutral arbiters in the criminal law generally . . . and from
Art. II, § 3 of the Constitution, which charges the President to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed" . . . .
Id. at 679 n.18.
The Executive's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted," Art. II, § 3, applies to all laws, not merely to criminal statutes . . . . It
would seem to follow that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, like the exercise
of Executive discretion generally, is subject to statutory and constitutional limits
enforceable through judicial review. . . The law has long recognized the dis-
tinction between judicial usurpation of discretionary authority and judicial review
of the statutory and constitutional limits to that authority.
Id. at 679 n.19. Cases reviewing agencies' prosecutorial discretion have confirmed this
distinction between courts' invalid usurpation of the prosecutor's discretionary authority
and courts' valid check against abuses of prosecutorial discretion. See Adams v. Richard-
son, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (distinguishing order stopping flow of HEW
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lematic under Bachowski, for reviewing courts cannot engage in the
factual inquiry that must precede a prosecutor's decision to file suit.03
Third, it would be imprudent for courts to force the Secretary to
sue when he is genuinely unwilling to do so. Although such a suit
would probably not be dismissed for lack of necessary "adversari-
ness,"' 14 it is likely that the Secretary would be reluctant to pursue the
funds to segregated schools from court order that agency take affirmative prosecutorial
action); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673-75, 675 n.19 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (SEC has broad
discretion in enforcing proxy rules; courts may examine reasons for agency decision not
to prosecute but may not dictate outcome of enforcement decisions); NAACP v. Levi,
418 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-17 (D.D.C. 1976) (court has jurisdiction to review allegedly dis-
criminatory policies of Department of Justice); cf. Seiden v. United States, 537 F.2d 867,
870 (6th Cir. 1976) (Attorney General's decisions not to defend individuals under Federal
Drivers Act can be reviewed by courts, but courts cannot mandate Attorney General to
defend under the Act).
Commentators arguing for greater judicial review of prosecutorial discretion gen-
erally have failed to distinguish between judicial review of decisions not to prosecute
and judicial compulsion of prosecution in individual cases. See, e.g., Cox, Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. Ciam. L. REv. 383 (1976); Note, Reviewability of Prosecu-
torial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 130, 146-61 (1975). But see Com-
ment, The Use of Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13 Am. CRIM. L. REv.
563, 575-76, 581-97 (1976) (courts cannot mandate prosecution of particular individuals
because that decision would usurp executive functions of prosecutor). See also note 113
infra.
63. Under Title IV, once the Secretary has determined that violations may have
affected an election's outcome, he must decide whether the case is "suitable for liti-
gation." See note 81 infra. This executive judgment involves analysis of the probity of
the evidence, the prospects of winning in a particular court, the likelihood of settling
the case without litigation, and the allocation of prosecutorial resources. Before a court
could compel suit, therefore, it would have to make the difficult determination that
"'no legitimate consideration informed the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute the
individual in question." Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (em-
phasis added). Because full factual inquiry is foreclosed by Bachowski, the court could
make this determination only by requiring the Secretary to issue new supplemental state-
ments whenever it was dissatisfied with a particular reason. Yet the Bachowski Court
warned that "endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the written statement is
inconsistent with the statute's goal of expeditious resolution of post-election disputes."
421 U.S. at 575.
64. The Bachowski Court reserved decision on whether a judicially-compelled suit
would lack the requisite "adversity of interest" to constitute an Article III "case or
controversy," 421 U.S. at 575 n.12. Several cases indicate that constitutional problems
might arise if the Secretary sued while persisting in the belief that the violations did
not affect the election's outcome. See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 47 (1971) (no constitutional "case or controversy" if both litigants desire same out-
come); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (no Article III "case" if no genuine
adversary issue exists between parties); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)
(statute unconstitutional because authorizing a nonadversarial "case" for the federal
courts). On the other hand, courts have often avoided this issue by considering the
arguments of an amicus curiae or intervenor. See, e.g., Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206, 210 n.9 (1968) (appointment of amicus). In the con-
text of Title IV, the requisite adversity of interest could be supplied by a complainant
intervenor. Cf. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (union member may intervene in
Title IV suit brought by Secretary of Labor).
9-02
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case vigorously65 Moreover, the court is not in a position to monitor
the Secretary's performance effectively.
Even if the Secretary ultimately decides to sue, judicial review will
have benefited the complainant little because the process is so lengthy.
Suits for judicial review under Bachowski have often lasted more
than a year,66 and the ensuing suit by the Secretary, if the past is any
guide, will consume an additional eighteen months.67 Since local
unions are required by the LMRDA to hold elections every three
years,0 8 the complainant will have gained, at most, only a moral
victory. 9
II. A Proposed Restructuring of Title IV Decisionmaking
The central problem in Title IV litigation, implicit in Bachowski,
is how to give complainants meaningful procedural protection for
their private interests without contravening Title IV's goal of min-
imizing governmental intrusion into union affairs.70 Judicial review
is an inadequate solution but does point to the need for some kind of
procedural protection for the legal rights of complainants recognized
65. It would, for example, be within the Secretary's discretion to settle the case with
the union out of court. See, e.g., Casey v. Brennan, No. 73-0836 AVZ (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1973) (unsuccessful mandamus action against Secretary, who acted within his discretion
in settling Title IV case without filing suit). Even if the Secretary brought suit and the
complainant intervened under Trbovich, the Secretary has broad discretion to settle
the case without regard to the intervenor's interest. See note 10 supra (listing cases
where complainants unsuccessfully challenged Secretary's discretion to enter into settle-
ment agreements).
66. See note 40 supra.
67. According to a Labor Department study conducted for the years 1966-1970, the
average Title IV suit took slightly longer than 18 months. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION
ELECTION CASES UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLosuRE ACTS 1966-
1970, at 118 (1972) [hereinafter cited as UNION ELECTION CASES].
68. LMRDA § 402(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a), (b) (1970).
69. Although hard to gauge, a "moral victory" might yet he substantial where it
enhances the prestige of the complainant during the rerun election. Cf. Brennan" v.
United Steelworkers Dist. 31, Civ. No. 73-957B (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 1974) (rerun of union
district election held 1% years after original election won by complainant-intervenor
Sadlowski as step in his ultimate quest for the presidency of the Steelworkers).
70. Despite criticisms of the Labor Department's handling of Title IV suits, Congress
still recognizes the importance of the Department's screening and expediting functions
in processing them. UMW Hearings I1, supra note 8, at 3-4 (Sen. Javits), 70-71 (Sen. Taft).
Even Senator Robert Griffin, a House sponsor of LMRDA and one of the leading critics
of the Labor Department's enforcement of that Act, apparently favors administrative
reform that would leave exclusive enforcement of the LMRDA with the Labor Depart-
ment or t with some other government agency. Id. at 52-53 (colloquy with Sen. Taft).
Senator Griffin recognized that the purpose of the LMRDA was "to strike a balance
between the rights of individuals and the needs of the union as an institution." Id. at
51. But see Note, supra note 37, at 472-73, 567.
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in Trbovich and Bachowski.71 This Note proposes, as a more effective
solution, that Congress replace judicial review with procedural reforms
within the Labor Department.
Since courts have shown an increasing willingness to provide judicial
review for decisions once assumed to be unreviewable, Congress should
make explicit its desire to prevent review of agency decisions.72 In
order to subserve the LMRDA's overarching goal of assuring union
democracy with minimal governmental interference, Congress should
amend Title IV to preclude judicial review of the Secretary's decision
not to sue.
73
However, in light of the recognition by both Congress 74 and the
71. Given the fact that the Secretary is the complainant's "lawyer" and that the
complainant has a legal interest in the institution of the Title IV suit, the Department
should provide procedural protection for complainants' interests. Generally, courts and
commentators have recognized the need for procedures whereby individuals have a chance
to be heard and to contribute evidence when agencies make decisions that affect their
legal interests. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); National Welfare Rights Or-
ganization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 736-38 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Murphy & Hoffman, Current
Models for Improving Public Representation in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L.
REv. 391, 393-96 (1976). Specifically, there has been recurring criticism that the Labor
Department ignores complainants and their interests when it makes decisions regarding
Title IV suits. See p. 899 supra & notes 74 & 102-04 infra.
72. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that judicial review of final
agency action will be denied to the extent that statutes preclude review or the action
is committed to agency discretion by law. APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
However, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed these statutory exceptions to
judicial review. Statutory preclusion of review is now established only by "clear and
convincing evidence" of such congressional intent. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,
567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). See generally K. DAVis, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.09 (1976); Note, Statutory Preclusion of Ju-
dicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DuKE L.J. 431 (criticizing
Supreme Court's approach). Nonreviewability of agency action "committed to agency
discretion by law" has been termed "a very narrow exception" that is "applicable in
those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given
case there is no law to apply.' S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)." Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
73. Cf. 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (West Supp. 1977):
[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
74. During congressional hearings in 1970 and 1971, several members of Congress
who had helped to draft the LMRDA expressed concern that private rights should be
given greater recognition in the Secretary's enforcement of Title IV. Senator Jennings
Randolph, a member of the Conference Committee that drafted the final version of
the LMRDA, stated that "the basic thrust of the Landrum-Griffin Act, as passed in
1959, was to give to the individual worker a more direct and wholesome participation
in the procedures and policies within the union at the many levels to which lie had
the membership and the access." UMTV Hearings II, supra note 8, at 64. Senator Robert
Griffin, one of the original House sponsors of the LMRDA, stated that "a primary
904
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Supreme Court7a of the complainant's interest in a Title IV suit, Con-
gress should also amend Title IV to guarantee complainants notice of a
decision not to bring suit, a right to be heard, and administrative re-
view of adverse decisions. At a minimum, the Labor Department
should promulgate rules requiring such procedures.
A. Administrative Reforms
The proposed reforms would alter current procedures by providing
complainants notice and the right to be heard during the Depart-
ment's investigation and the right to appeal adverse decisions to a
professional review officer.76 These reforms, modeled largely on the
procedures used to initiate NLRB unfair labor practice cases and
representation cases, 77 would revise the decisionmaking procedures of
the Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA),78 but the
basic structure and investigatory nature of the LMSA's activities would
not be changed.
The process now begins when the union member files a complaint
with an LMSA Area Office. The Area Office first determines whether
the complainant has exhausted his internal union remedies and has
filed his objections with the LMSA in a timely fashion. If these require-
ments are met the Area Office undertakes an investigation-without
consultation with the complainant-into the validity of the complain-
ant's allegations and submits, usually within 30 days of receiving the
aim of Landrum-Griffin was to protect the rights of individual workers within a union."
Id. at 46.
But I also believed that when courts came to a situation where doubt existed [as to
the meaning and purpose of Title IV of the Act], they would resolve the doubt in
favor of the objectives of the law, which are to protect the individual worker and
to give him the benefit of the doubt, as opposed to the entrenched union hierarchy.
But I must say, almost without exception, the Labor Department and the courts
have gone the other way, and consistently and persistently resolved all the doubts
in favor of the entrenched union hierarchy and against the individual worker.
Id. at 49. See also id. at 3-4, 48-50, 64.
75. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Trbovich v. UMV, 404 U.S. 528
(1972).
76. See Note, supra note 37, at 500 (arguing for greater complainant input in Title
IV decision process).
77. See generally NLRB FELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971). See K. DAvIs, DISCRErIONARY
JUSTICE 207 (1969) (procedures of NLRB General Counsel's Office include "the major
elements of a full structuring of discretionary power-findings, reasons, precedents, checks
through appeals and through internal supervision, and procedural protections").
78. The LMSA is the dihision of the Labor Department that is responsible for ad-
ministering most of the provisions of the LMRDA, including the provisions of Title
IV. The LMSA is headed by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management
Relations in Washington. The LMSA has six regional offices (New York City, Philadel-
phia, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, and San Francisco) and 24 area offices. U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT 9- REPORTING IN 1974 UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGE-
.MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 1, 114-15 [hereinafter cited as CO.MPLIANCE 1974].
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complaint, a Report of Investigation (ROI) to the Regional and Na-
tional Offices3 9 Based on the ROI, the decision (made in Washington)
will be to bring suit if it appears that the violations the Area Office
uncovered "may have affected the outcome of the election"80 and that
the case is "suitable for litigation."18  The proposed reforms would
alter this process by bringing the complainant's point of view into the
investigation. 2 Thus, the Area Director would appoint a hearing
officer who would investigate the allegations of the complaint, con-
sult with the union and complainant informally, collect sworn evi-
dence in informal investigatory conferences or hearings, 3 and seek
79. See UNION ELECTION CASES, supra note 67, at 4-5; Note, supra note 37, at 489-92.
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.136 (1976); UNION ELECTION CASES, supra note 67, at 5.
81. The Labor Department considers a case "not suitable for litigation" if the evi-
dence is of doubtful probity, the union reforms the challenged procedure, or the De-
partment prefers to await the outcome of a similar case pending in court. See UNION
ELECTION CASES, supra note 67, at 5. See also Note, supra note 37, at 498 (describing four
situations which are, in practice, regarded as "not suitable for litigation").
82. Currently the local investigation does not seek the assistance and input of com-
plainants. See Note, supra note 37, at 500; note 103 infra.
83. There are two models which form the basis for the proposed investigatory pro-
cedures: the Labor Department's own procedures in formulating rules for rerun elections
under Title IV and procedures other agencies use in conducting informal, non-adversarial
hearings.
The proposed hearing resembles the Labor Department's "Pre-Election Conference" in
which the Department recommends rules to be followed in elections supervised by the
Secretary under Title IV. After notice, a public conference is held at which the com-
plainant, officers, and other union members may discuss remedies and proffer additional
conditions to govern the rerun election. A member who disagrees with the Secretary's
final rules may contest the decision in court. See Brennan v. Sindicato Empleados Equipo
Pesado, 90 L.R.R.M. 3087 (D.P.R. 1975) (describing pre-election conference and up-
holding the Secretary's rules).
NLRB representation procedures are similar to, although more formal than, the pro-
cedures proposed in this Note. See NLRB FIELD MANUAL, supra note 77, §§ 11000-11480.
After a petition is filed, the Area Office contacts all interested parties and conducts a
preliminary investigation into the allegations. Id. §§ 11000-11016. Based on the results of
this investigation the Regional Director determines whether a hearing is necessary. Id.
§ 11080-11080.4. An investigatory hearing is conducted at which the hearing officer enter-
tains motions, seeks stipulations of fact and settlements, and arranges for an orderly
development of pertinent evidence. Id. §§ 11180-11184, 11200. Evidence is not limited to
that admissible in court and may include materials from the Area Office file, testimony
of witnesses, stipulations, documents, and records. Id. §§ 11216-11230. The final decision
whether to hold an election is made by the Regional Director and may be reviewed by
the NLRB. Id. §§ 11274-11284. This procedure-especially its delegation of decisionmaking
-has recently been praised. Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Board:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 258, 281-82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NLRB
Hearings]. For other examples of informal investigatory hearing procedures, see NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART ONE): UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
PROCEEDING §§ 10056-10056.8, 10058-10060 (1975) (description of NLRB Regional Office
investigation to determine whether to prosecute unfair labor practice charge) [hereinafter
cited as NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL]; 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1975) (Veterans Administration
hearing officer to assist claimant in seeking out all relevant information); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404-927-.934 (1976) (Social Security Administration hearing officer questions witnesses,
seeking out information on his own).
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formal determinations by which the union might remedy the viola-
tions voluntarily.8 4
Currently, all decisions to bring suit are made in Washington by
the Solicitor of Labor and the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-
Management Relations, after consulting with the Deputy Solicitor and
the Bureau of Elections and Trusteeships.- The proposed reforms
would leave such decisions to the Area Office. The Area Office
would be required to give reasons for its decisions and those decisions
would be final, unless the complainant or another union member ap-
pealed within ten days to a newly created Appellate Review Board,86
consisting of three to eight Administrative Law Judges (ALJs).8  The
Board would immediately assign the case to one of its members, who
would decide the appeal within 20 days. If questions of law alone were
at issue, the ALJ would render a decision in Washington, the standard
of review being "clear mistake of law." If the appeal involved ques-
84. A "formal determination' is an agreement between the Department and the
union that the latter will remedy the alleged violations voluntarily. UNION ELECTION
CASES, supra note 67, at 5. Cf. NLRB FIELD MANUAL, supra note 77, §§ 11188, 11200.
The Area Office should include in the agreement a provision that the 60-day limit
on filing suit would be waived if the union violates the agreement.
85. See UNION ELECION CASES, supra note 67, at 5; Note, supra note 37, at 496-99.
86. A direct analogue is the procedure for appeals to the NLRB General Counsel
when a Regional Director refuses to file an unfair labor practices complaint. The
Regional Director must provide a full statement of reasons for dismissing the charge.
NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 83, §§ 10122-10122.8. Interested parties may
appeal the regional decision to the General Counsel in Washington, id. § 10122A,
and may appear in person to present evidence and argumentation. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6
(1976). The administrative decision after appeal is final and unreviewable in the
courts. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (dictum). Cf. 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.109-.112,
19.128-.147 (1976) (appeal to Board of Veterans Appeals, with investigatory hearing
at place convenient to claimant); 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.21(d), .23(b) (1976) (appeal to
NLRB in representation cases); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945-.952 (1976) (appeal to Social
Security Appeals Council).
87. ALJs are professional decisionmakers who preside over agency hearings. They
are appointed and certified by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) based on the
Commission's examination of the applicant's personal and professional qualifications.
See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203 (1976); Dullca, Development of the Personnel Program for Ad-
ministrative Law Judges, 25 AD. L. REv. 41, 43, 45 (1973) (rigorous screening process
to ferret out best qualified ALJs). An ALJ is assigned to an agency by the CSC. He is
then governed and bound by the agency's rules and precedents but is still highly
independent in that he cannot be transferred, promoted, assigned nonadjudicatory
duties, or removed without the prior approval of the CSC. Id. at 46; Zwerdling,
Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. REv. 9, 12 (1973);
5 C.F.R. §§ 930.204-.234 (1976). See generally M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
L.jW JUDGES (1974). Based on length of service, judgment, and judicial expertise, the
Commission grants pay raises and promotions, transfers ALJs from agency to agency
(usually to agencies where they are at a higher civil service grade), and promotes
ALJs to Chief Judges. See 5 C.F.R. § 930-204, .206, .210 (1976); Miller, The Education
and Development of Admihistrative Law Judges, 25 AD. L. REv. 1, 5 (1973). Because
their careers depend on their objectivity and judgment, and because most ALJs
appear to be well-qualified, appellate review systems using ALJs have been praised
for producing more open, consistent, and accurate agency decisions. See notes 108 & 109
infra.
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 907 1976-1977
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 885, 1977
tions of fact, as is more likely, the ALJ would go to the Area Office to
conduct an informal investigatory hearing to resolve factual disputes,8
The ALJ's opinion would be finals9 and would determine whether
the Labor Department brought suit. 0 The objectives of the proposed
reforms are to decentralize and professionalize the decisionmaking
process and to give the complainant a greater opportunity to present
his point of view.91
B. Rulemaking
In order to facilitate a fair hearing and meaningful review, the
Labor Department should promulgate, through rulemaking subject to
judicial review,92 guidelines for the decision process.9 3 Under the
88. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 19.138 (1975) (hearing for appellate review by Board of Veterans
Appeals held in Washington or at locus near claimant's residence, at claimant's choice);
20 C.F.R. § 404.949 (1976) (when Social Security Appeals Council accepts new evidence,
with ALJ or Council member appointed to receive evidence personally).
89. Cf. 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (West Supp. 1977) (decision of Board of Veterans Ap-
peals final and unreviewable); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950-.951 (1976) (decision of Social
Security Appeals Council final).
90. During the ALJ's investigation, the hearing officer and the Area Office might
continue negotiations with the union to seek settlement of the case or voluntary
compliance and could be given limited powers to obtain from the union an extension
of the time for filing suit. However, the Secretary should aaopt rules and procedures
to govern the decision to seek an extension. See Note, supra note 34, at 1225-27
(suggesting that the Labor Department adopt express standards for seeking extensions
and give complainants a chance to request expeditious handling of a case).
91. There are three ways to protect the complainants' interests in lieu of-or in
addition to-the reforms suggested in this Note. Two alternatives-granting a more
expansive scope of review and allowing complainants to bring their own suits against
unions-do not adequately reflect Congress's concern that unions be protected from
diffuse and potentially frivolous litigation. The third possibility is to allow com-
plainants to bring pre-election suits under Title I of LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-413
(1970), to protect individuals' rights to vote and to run for union office. These suits
are less disruptive than the post-election suits brought by the Secretary, and it is
arguable that Congress did not intend to foreclose these suits to complainants. See
generally Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act: Tile "Twi-
light Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the Guarantees of Titles I and
V, 74 COLUt. L. REv. 1105 (1974).
92. Under APA informal rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), the agency
must (1) publish notice of proposed rulemaking, including a description of the issues
involved, (2) give interested persons an opportunity to participate through submission
of written documents, with or without opportunity for oral presentation, and (3)
formulate final rules, incorporating therein "a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose." See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rules invalid, because of insufficient public notice); Wright, The Courts and the
Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 COPRELL L. REV. 375, 380, 395-97
(1974).
Commentators have long urged the increased use of rulemaking. See, e.g., K.
DAVIS, ADMINIsmTLvTiE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.13 (1976); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATivE AGENCIES (1962). Courts likewise have recognized the value of rule-
making in clarifying policy and protecting against arbitrary action. See, e.g., Silva v.
Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir. 1975).
93. At present, the Department of Labor has published no formal rules for
decisionmaking. Existing rules interpreting § 402 do little more than summarize the
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revised Title IV, for instance, the Secretary would not bring suit if
the proven violations were too insignificant to have affected the elec-
tion's outcome or if the case were unsuitable for litigation.94 Rule-
making should be used to define standards for these cases. For ex-
ample, more precise rules should be formulated for determining how
much of an effect certain systemic violations of Title IV are presumed
to have on the outcome of an election. 95 The rules might take the
form of generalizations or simple hypothetical cases;90 as such, they
would offer uniform guidelines for hearing officers and ALJs, would
give fair notice to complainants of the standards used to decide cases,
and would be subject to judicial review to ensure that departmental
policy comported with the goals of Title IVY7
A related purpose of rulemaking would be to give the Department
flexibility to choose and to abandon areas of litigation in order to al-
locate prosecutorial resources efficiently and to effectuate the goals of
national labor policy. s Under the suggested reforms, the Labor De-
statutory provisions. Compare 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.135-.136 (1976) (unilluminating rules
interpreting LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970)) with id. §§ 452.11-.134 (1976) (detailed
rules interpreting LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970)). See also Note, supra note 37,
at 516-17 (criticizing the Department of Labor for not engaging in rulemaking).
Courts generally have not required agencies to formulate general rules for decision-
making. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). But cf. K. DAVIS,
DISCRLrIONARY JUSTICE 68 n.17 (1969) (criticizing NLRB for failing to make rules for
decisionmaking).
94. See p. 906 & notes 80 & 81 supra.
95. Cf. Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery, 45 U.S.L.V. 4089 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977)
(union rule that disqualifies 96.5% of local employees from seeking office is presump-
tive violation of LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970)). The Court's decision may
lead the Labor Department to formulate specific rules-in the form of hypotheticals-
defining further the import of the decision. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 452.38(a) (1976) (factors
to consider in determining whether meeting-attendance eligibility requirements violate
LMRDA).
96. See K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTICE 60 (1969): "[A] rule need not be in the
form of an abstract generalization; a rule can be limited to resolving one or more
hypothetical cases, without generalizing." One such hypothetical is contained in a
Labor Department booklet designed to help union members understand their rights
under the LMRDA. See LMSA, ELECTING UNION OFFICERS 22 (1974): "For example,
if one member was improperly denied the right to vote but all election contests were
won by more than one vote, the Secretary would not bring a civil action because the
violation could not have affected the election outcome for any office."
97. Congress should limit judicial review to independent attacks on departmental
rules outside the context of particular enforcement proceedings. Cf. Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 427-31 (1944) (Congress has the power to provide that administra-
tive rules may not be collaterally attacked in enforcement proceedings).
98. Such flexibility is necessary for the continued evolution of national labor
policy. See COMPLIANCE 1974, supra note 78, at 5-8 (describing Secretary's suits chal-
lenging attendance requirements which preclude many union members from being
nominated to union office); Steelworkers Local 3489 v. Usery, 45 U.S.L.W. 4089 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1977) (Supreme Court agrees with Secretary's interpretation that rule dis-
qualifying 96.5% of members from seeking office violates Title IV).
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partment could continue to fine-tune its enforcement program; this
fine-tuning would be accomplished, however, by rulemaking rather
than by ad hoc agency decisions. 99 To demand that an agency engage
in self-limitation by promulgating rules is to demand not that an
agency surrender its flexibility, but that it eschew resort to unprin-
cipled or inconsistent decisions. 00
C. The Proposed Reforms and Title IV
The proposed administrative reforms mandate no fundamental
changes in the Title IV decisionmaking process. Yet by restructuring
administrative discretion the reforms would resolve Title IV's con-
flicting goals better than the Supreme Court was able to do in
Bachowski.10 The reforms would enhance the perceived fairness of
decisions and give complainants a meaningful chance to be heard,
without contravening other important goals of Title IV.
1. Fairness to Complainants and Protection of
Their Statutory Rights
Title IV complainants and members of Congress have criticized the
Labor Department's present procedures as unfair -02 Critics have ob-
99. "Interpretive" rulemaking (where there is no provision for public comment
and judicial review) is now used by the Department to present its policy interpreta-
tions of Title IV to unions. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.1 (1976). See also U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT 9- DISCLOSURE IN 1973 UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 7 n.2 (Secretary responded to developing caselaw
on the use of absentee ballots by promulgating a revised interpretive bulletin keyed
to specific court cases). It would be little additional burden for the Department to
issue formal rules, with opportunity for public comment. For example, the United
States Parole Commission revises its policies (embodied in its "Guidelines for Deci-
sionmaking" chart governing release on parole) through formal rulemaking with
opportunity for public comment. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1976). The Commission is able
to publish revisions several times a year to fine-tune its regulations to meet changing
policy goals. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 52889 (1976) (notice of rulemaking promulgated
November 26, 1976, with comments due by January 24, 1977, the final rule being
issued at or near that date).
100. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTIs.TivE LAW TEXT § 6.03 (1972).
101. If Congress does not amend Title IV to preclude judicial review, the
procedures and rulemaking discussed above would still be useful reforms. Besides
providing effective notice and hearing for the complainant, the reforms would make
judicial review a more effective check by building a record suitable for judicial examina-
tion. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1963); National Rifle
Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 407 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D.D.C. 1976). See note 49 supra.
102. For the strident (and often partisan) attacks of dissatisfied complainants, see
AUTOCRACY, supra note 7, at 13-14, 17-18, 29, 55-56, 62, 117-20, 259; UMW Hearings
II, supra note 8, at 5-6, 16, 24-25, 31-32, 61-63. For congressional criticisms, see id. at
1-3, 46-50, 63-64, 70-71. Senator Robert Griffin has been an especially acute critic of
the Labor Department's enforcement of Title IV: "[I]t appears to me that the Labor
Department is very reticent about protecting the rights and interests of the rank and
file." Id. at 46.
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jected that the complainant has no opportunity to contribute either
his evidence or his point of view, whereas union leaders are often in
close contact with the Department's investigation. 103 They also argue
that the standards governing decisions are vague and often suspect.'04
Thus the present decisionmaking structure promotes at least the ap-
pearance of unfairness. 10 Because judicial review under Bachowski
disclaims any inquiry into the factual basis of the Secretary's decisions,
it has done little to allay doubts as to their propriety. 06
The proposed reforms would enhance both the appearance and
reality of fairness in three ways. First, through public rulemaking
procedures, the Secretary would formulate guidelines for decision-
making that would constitute effective notice to complainants of what
they must show in order to merit a Title IV suit. Second, the Secre-
tary's investigation would be more open to participation by the com-
103. The most common objection is that the Labor Department's investigatory and
decision process is biased toward incumbents, since the local office consults the union
in the course of an investigation (e.g., seeking evidence and possible settlement), but
often ignores the complainant entirely. For instance, in 1970 union dissidents com-
plained about violations of the LMRDA in the elections of District 5, UMW. Al-
though the dissidents were eager to assist in the investigation, the Labor Department
gave them little if any notice of its progress and instead entered into negotiations
with the union. UMW Hearings II, supra note 8, at 31-34, 61-64. Kenneth Yablonski,
an attorney for the complainants, objected that the Labor Department's nonenforce-
ment was "a shocking example of poor administrative procedures, a built-in pro-
incumbent bias . . . and a disregard for the private rights of union members." Id. at
63. For other complaints that the departmental procedure has a pro-incumbent bias,
see Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, 20 n.10, Trbovich v. UMNV, 404 U.S. 528 (1972); Mo-
tion to Intervene at 6-7, Brennan v. Plumbers Local 449, 64 F.R.D. 633 ( W.D. Pa.
1974) (alleging Department ignored complainant in handling Title IV suit); Ap-
plicants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs,
Brennan v. Connecticut State UAW Community Action Program Council, 60 F.R.D.
626 (D. Conn. 1973) (same); Hall, Law, Democracy and the Unions, in AUTOCRACY,
supra note 7, at 109, 119-20; Spira, Rebel Voices in the NMU, in id., at 47, 55-56;
Note, supra note 37, at 500-02.
104. Complainants often appear to resent the fact that all decisionmaking occurs in
Washington, where a suit may be denied because it is deemed "not suitable for
litigation." See Note, supra note 37, at 498. This resentment may stem from a strong
(although unverified) suspicion that political influences improperly affect outcomes.
See id. at 499-500 (counsel for complainants and unions share this suspicion); Hall,
Labor Insurgency and the Legal Trap, in AUTOCRACY, supra note 7, at 255, 259-64.
105. Most complainant resentment against the Department seems to be galvanized
not by official wrongdoing, but by departmental procedures and policies. See, e.g.,
UMJV Hearings II, supra note 8, at 91-95, 104-05, 123-28, 199-207 (correspondence
between UMW dissidents and Department).
106. Complainants obviously consider judicial review under Bachowski unresponsive
to their factual objections to the Secretary's refusals to sue. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Mo-
tion to Vacate Judgment, Fletcher v. Dunlop, 91 L.R.R.M. 2113 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
Bachowski v. Brennan, 405 F. Supp. 1227, 1233-34 (W.D. Pa. 1975). At least one district
court has criticized the Labor Department's failure to be responsive to the com-
plainant's contentions in its reasons statement. See Valenta v. Brennan, 90 L.R.R.M.
3316 (N.D. Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1122 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1977).
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plainant and other union members.' 0 7 Third, the process of investiga-
tion and review would be more professional, owing to the greater use
of ALJs.105 By opening up and furnishing standards for the decision
process, these reforms would provide a continuing check against ad-
ministrative arbitrariness;' 0 9 and by providing for notice, participa-
tion in the investigatory process, opportunity to present and examine
evidence, and professional administrative review by a disinterested
107. Courts and commentators long have recognized the importance of public
participation in agency investigations and hearings. See National Welfare Rights
Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1970); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 22.08 (Supp. 1972); Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened
Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 527-30 (1972);
Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
HARv. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1968). Congress likewise has stressed the need for in-
creased participation in agency proceedings as a means of protecting private interests
and of reaching decisions consistent with the broader public interest. See, e.g, Public
Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings: Hearings on S.2715 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of subcommittee chairman Edward Kennedy).
108. Recent congressional hearings have emphasized the need for increased delega-
tion of agency decisionmaking to professional hearing officers and ALJs. See Over-
sight of CAB Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 442, 1154-61 (1975); Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S.518 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 249-55 (1967) (article by Frank Cooper) [hereinafter cited
as APA Hearings]; id. at 295 (statement of Merritt Ruhlen, Federal Trial Examiners
Conference).
Decisionmaking models embodying an initial determination by a hearing officer
followed by administrative review by an appeals board or ALJ have been praised for
producing decisions that are well respected and cogently reasoned. See Gillilland, The
Certiorari-Type Review, 26 AD. L. REv. 53 (1974) (examining and commending ap-
pellate review boards in FCC, ICC, CAB, Patent Office, AEC, SEC); cf. Berkemeyer,
Agency Review by Intermediate Boards, 26 AD. L. REv. 61, 64-66 (1974) (citing ad-
vantages of FCC's delegation of review power to professional hearing officers: ac-
curacy, better quality of opinions, increased predictability and consistency, separation
of policy making and adjudicatory functions). See generally I REco-mINENoDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 122 (1968-1970)
(Committee Report on Recommendation 6, "Delegation of Final Decisional Authority
Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency"); Note, Intermediate Appellate Re-
view Boards for Administrative Agencies, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1325 (1968) (examining
FCC, ICC, CAB review boards and recommending that agencies rely more extensively
on such professional decisionmakers).
109. See note 113 infra. An instructive parallel may be found in the West German
judicial system. That system provides for administrative review of prosecutorial deci-
sions in criminal cases. If the prosecutor decides not to bring suit against an accused
person, a private citizen may file a departmental complaint, initiating review of the
decision by an official in the prosecutor's office; in addition, each prosecutor is
supervised by a superior, who periodically reviews the prosecutor's files. Commentators
have praised the procedures as an impartial and effective check on prosecutorial
discretion, because the review is conducted by a professional at a higher level in the
bureaucratic hierarchy. See Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the
Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468, 503-04 (1974);
Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 439, 465-66
(1974). See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 194-95 (1969).
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decisionmaker, the reforms would contribute to greater public and
complainant satisfaction with the fairness of Labor Department deci-
sions.110
Thus, precluding complainants from seeking judicial review of the
Department's decisions would be neither an unconstitutional denial
of due process"-' nor an elimination of a functionally independent
check against abuse of discretion in the Labor Department." 2 The
largely ineffectual judicial check against arbitrary agency action would
be replaced with an open system of publicly promulgated standards,
complainant input, and factual review of initial decisions. It has been
persuasively argued that the latter system is often a more effective
check on administrative arbitrariness-especially in the area of prosecu-
torial discretion-than is judicial review for "abuse of discretion."' "13
Besides ensuring procedural fairness and enhancing the perceived
legitimacy of the Secretary's decisions, the proposed reforms would pro-
110. See LaTour, Houlden, Walker & Thibaut, Procedure: Transnational Perspec-
tives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 283-84 (1976).
111. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) (administrative
procedures provide adequate due process; no due process right to judicial review).
Cf. Sacz v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024
(1972) (charging party's legal interest in NLRB unfair labor practice complaint is not
sufficiently serious to merit due process protection). On the other hand, due process
may require that courts adjudicate constitutional challenges to statutes and rules.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-73 (1974) (Congress's foreclosure of review of
Veterans Administration decisions does not preclude constitutional challenges to
Veterans Readjustment Act of 1966); Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233,
241-44 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (constitutional challenge to Selective Service's
published regulations not precluded by Congress). But see note 97 supra.
112. In general, agency appellate review boards have been respected for their im-
partiality. See note 108 supra. Moreover, the careers of ALJs depend on their profes-
sional objectivity and independence of judgment, see note 87 supra; hence, it is not
surprising that other agencies using ALJ decisionmakers have found the procedures
helpful and sympathetic to claimants. See, e.g., Popkin, Effectiveness of the Social Security
Review System in Disability Cases, 26 AD. L. REV. 79, 82-83 (1974); Smith, Social Security
Appeals in Disability Cases, 28 AD. L. REV. 13, 25 (1976).
113. K. DAvis, DIscRErIONARY JusricE 205-07, 226-28 (1969), argues that openness is
the best check on administrative arbitrariness and sets up as a model of open
decisionmaking the NLRB's handling of unfair labor practice cases. The administra-
tive reforms proposed in this Note are modeled in part on the procedures used in
unfair labor practice cases. See p. 905 supra. Indeed, most of the recent literature
favoring limitations on prosecutorial discretion de-emphasize judicial review and
endorse openness and administrative structuring of discretion as the most effective
checks on abuse. See Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law
for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Ass. CRt. L. REv. 473, 495-503 (1976) (proposing
published rules and policies, administrative safeguards, and limited judicial review as
best means of controlling prosecutorial discretion); Cox, supra note 62, at 395, 399-403,
43- (advocating administrative openness as the "soundest solution to the problems of
prosecutorial discretion" and warning against dangers of "judicialization" of prosecutor's
decisionmaking); cf. K. DAvis, AnINIsmsRArIva LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 28.00-1 (1976)
(favoring administrative standards, findings, reasons, systems of precedents as best checks
on prosecutorial discretion). See note 109 supra.
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vide greater protection for the complainant's rights. The recommended
procedures would be superior to judicial review under Bachowski be-
cause they would afford the complainant easier access to the review
process, would enable him to be heard at a more meaningful time, and
would no longer burden him with a heavy judicial presumption
against his position.
The agency review process would be more accessible because it
would bring the complainant's viewpoint directly into the investiga-
tory process, at small expense and minimal red tape for the com-
plainant. The Area Office would be required to consider the complain-
ant's testimony and other evidence during the investigation and to
assist him in framing his objections if he disagrees with the hearing
officer's decision. 114 On review, the ALJ would elicit pertinent in-
formation from the complainant and other union members."; As a
result, the complainant need not hire an attorney." 6 Should he choose
to hire an attorney the cost would not be great, in view of the in-
formality of the procedures and the short time devoted to decision
and appeal. Presently, few complainants can afford the expense of
judicial review; by replacing judicial review with more informal, less
time-consuming procedures, the proposed reforms would make it
easier for the average union member to obtain a hearing."-7
The new procedures also would permit the complainant to obtain a
hearing early in the decision process, when a hearing is more mean-
ingful. The Bachowski Court characterized the Secretary as the com-
plainant's "lawyer" and the reasons statement as part of his duty
114. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1975) (Veterans Administration hearing officer assists
claimant in seeking out all relevant evidence); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK §§ 118-124, 2009 (5th ed. 1974) (government personnel provided
to assist claimants).
115. Cf. Smith, supra note 112, at 25 (ALJs in Social Security hearings usually helpful
to claimants in development of their cases).
116. The assistance of an attorney, while not necessary, will probably be helpful,
especially in appealing adverse decisions. Cf. ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
ANNUAL REPORT 1975, at 115. But cf. Popkin, supra note 112, at 84-85 (Social Security
claimants benefit from using paralegals).
117. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 145 (1969):
By and large, administrative appeals are in many aspects preferable to judicial
review, especially for small cases, because they are less expensive, because in many
of them a party need not be represented by counsel, and because they usually
reach the merits of cases without becoming enmeshed in legal technicalities that
plague reviewing courts . ...
Of course, if complainants could be awarded attorneys' fees the cost of judicial
review would be less of an obstacle. See Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (dictum) (proposing that courts award attorneys' fees to Bachowski plain-
tiffs if "common benefit" accrues to union members).
Vol. 86: 885, 1977
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towards his client.118 The Secretary would discharge his duty better
by also engaging his client in prior consultation. Under the proposed
reforms the complainant's opinions, factual data, and rebuttal evi-
dence would be part of the record upon which the decision to sue is
made and reviewed. 119 In this way, the complainant's factual presenta-
tion would become an important part of the decision process and could
not be ignored, as it is under the narrow scope of review Bachowski
prescribes.
Finally, the new procedures would relieve the complainant of the
heavy presumption of agency correctness that inheres in judicial re-
view for abuse of discretion under an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. Instead, the ALJ would reverse the hearing examiner and
direct that suit be brought in cases where the examiner had committed
material errors of fact or law.12 0
2. Minimum Interference in Union Affairs
Not only would the proposed reforms afford greater protection for
the complainant's interest than judicial review, but they would do so
with far less risk of impairing other statutory goals. Congress vested
the Secretary with exclusive power to bring Title IV suits in order to
shield unions from frivolous litigation and to effect speedy resolution
118, 421 U.S. at 572. Cf. Trbovich v. UMXV, 404 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1972): "[T]he
statute gives the individual union members certain rights against their union, and
'the Secretary of Labor in effect becomes the union member's lawyer' for purposes
of enforcing those rights. 104 Cong. Rec. 10947 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)."
119, Complainants are often willing and even anxious to contribute pertinent in-
formation to facilitate the departmental investigation. See, e.g., UMW Hearings II,
supra note 8, at 79, 222-25 (documents suggesting evidentiary leads and interpreting
union constitution); id. at 106-11, 134-45, 166-71, 185-91, 229-71 (letters from com-
plainants' counsel, with factual information and legal argument); id. at 150-61 (af-
fidavits, including several pro se, handwritten affidavits). By permitting complainants
to intervene in Title IV suits, the Court in Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 537 n.8
(1972), implicitly recognized the value of complainants' special knowledge of unions'
internal structures and of the subtle devices that may be used to influence election
results. See Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
Subsequent case law under Trbovich has confirmed the value of complainants' partic-
ipation. See Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(remanding to determine whether intervenors were entitled to attorneys' fees on
account of their expertise in unearthing "material and even elusive evidence" and in
developing "telling arguments in support of the Secretary's claims of illegality");
Bibbs v. Brennan, No. 74-1562 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1974) (Secretary's error in interpreting
union constitution corrected by complainant).
120. This standard is far more liberal than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review under Bachowski. Compare Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-75
(1975) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917-.940, 404.945-.950 (1976) (Social Security Appeals Council
engages in de novo factual review). Of course, no "separation of powers" questions arise
when an ALJ within the Labor Department reverses the decision of the hearing officer
and "compels" suit. Cf. Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 nn.18 & 19 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(noting federal courts have generally refused to mandate prosecution of particular in-
dividuals at request of private persons).
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of post-election disputes. Judicial review has frustrated these goals by
enmeshing unions in protracted litigation. The proposed reforms
would resolve complainant objections more swiftly and with less in-
trusion into union affairs.
Under the proposed reforms the Secretary's screening function is
restored. Unions are spared the expenses of litigation unless expert
decisionmakers within the Labor Department find probable cause to
believe the complaint is meritorious. The union, of course, is free to
participate in the administrative process and may elect to do so. But
its presence cannot be coerced, as it is by joinder in suits for judicial
review. Moreover, since the administrative procedures would remain
essentially investigatory, rather than adjudicative, the union would not
be burdened with formal pleadings, motions for discovery, large at-
torneys' fees and court expenses, or the publicity and harassment that
frequently accompany a lawsuit.' 2 '
The proposed reforms would likewise preserve the statutory goal
of speedy resolution of post-election disputes. The existing timetable
for investigation would be retained, and most complaints would be
processed to a conclusion within the 60-day limitation period.122 The
new procedures depart from the present system mainly by providing
a hearing at the investigatory stage of the process and internal review
after the initial decision regarding suit is made. The addition of an
investigatory hearing should not occasion delay: indeed, the similar
(though more judicialized) hearing procedure used in NLRB repre-
sentation cases has proved expeditious. 123
121. Union officers currently have a legal duty to cooperate with the departmental
investigation by providing the Area Office with documents and information. See, e.g.,
Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union, 490 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1974)
(union duty to supply documents relevant to Secretary's investigation). The proposed
procedures should prove no more burdensome. The hearing officer and ALJ would
control the hearings, much as the Area Office now coordinates the investigation;
complainants would have no independent discovery rights against the union or its
officers. Attorneys should not be necessary, since the presiding officer would minimize
legal technicalities by concentrating on the facts of the case and the applicable rules.
Such "non-judicialized" procedures have found favor elsewhere. The NLRB (in
representation cases) and Social Security Administration (in disability cases) have
defended their informal processes and opposed "judicializing" decisionmaking hearings
with formal pleadings, discovery, and rules of evidence. APA Hearings, supra note
108, at 219, 226-28 (statement of Frank W. McCulloch, then Chairman of NLRB,
stressing the need for informal, rather than judicial and adversarial, procedures in
NLRB representation hearings); id. at 151-52 (statement of Wilbur Cohen, then Under
Secretary of HEV, praising nonadversarial Social Security hearings).
122. Exceptions may occur, as under the present system, for negotiating consent
agreements. That is, the union may waive the 60-day limitation period in hopes of
settling the case out of court. See note 34 supra.
123. The NLRB conducted 9112 representation elections in fiscal 1974. Eighty-two
per cent of these elections were conducted within 44 days of the filing of the original
Vol. 86: 885, 1977
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 916 1976-1977
Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review
The internal review process, moreover, will in large part replicate
current LMSA procedures. At present, the decision to sue is made in
Washington, based on review of the file and recommendations of the
Area and Regional Directors. 24 Under the proposed reforms, the
decision to sue would be made by an ALJ, based on review of the
opinion and record of the hearing examiner. Because the internal
review process would be nonjudicial it should move swiftly. Experience
in the NLRB General Counsel's Office and the Veterans Administra-
tion, for example, suggests the value of such informal procedures in
eliminating formalized motions and minimizing delay.' 25 It is a fair
estimate that between 20 and 60 decisions would be appealed to the
newly-created Review Board each year.120 The three to eight ALJs on
the Board should be able to handle this caseload expeditiously. 27
Finally, few of the appealed cases should require an entire de novo
proceeding. Most will involve questions of policy interpretation or
discrete facts; the ALJ would limit his review to the issues raised on
petition. This 44-day period included the time spent on investigation, hearings, and
preparation of a final decision by the Regional Director. See NLRB Hearings, supra
note 83, at 6-7. This record is especially impressive, since NLRB representation cases,
unlike Title IV cases, are adjudicated under no statutory time pressures.
124. See p. 907 supra.
125. In the late 1960s, the General Counsel decided appeals in an average of just
over 20 days. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNsEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONs 1969-70, at 29. For a description of the procedures for General
Counsel appeals, see note 86 supra. In fiscal 1974, disposition of cases certified to the
Board of Veterans Appeals took on average about two months. Almost 1000 cases
were processed by formal hearing before the Board. ADnMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AF-
FAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 1974, at 121. The Review Board proposed for Title IV cases
would be required to process far fewer cases, see note 126 infra, and would be held
to rigid time limits.
126. During fiscal 1965-1974, an average of 130 Title IV complaints were filed with the
Labor Department annually. About 45 complaints were dismissed each year in the
Area and Regional Offices because the complainant either failed to exhaust union
remedies or failed to file his complaint in a timely manner, or because the Area
Office found no violations. In about 24 cases each year the Labor Department secured
"voluntary compliance," where the union took corrective action without the need
for bringing suit. COMPLIANCE 1974, supra note 78, at 4. Under the proposed ad-
ministrative procedures, only a few of these cases (mostly those in which the Area
Office found no violations) would be appealed beyond the Area Office. Of the remaining
60 cases (those in which suit was brought or where violations were found not to have
affected the election's outcome), it is a fair guess that 25% to 50% would be appealed.
Cf. 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 210 (1976) (Table 3B) (of 2282 NLRB representation cases
decided by Regional Directors in fiscal year 1975, requests for review were filed in 652
cases). This would suggest that the newly-created Review Board would have to handle
between 15 and 30 cases annually. More recent statistics (fiscal year 1974) would suggest
the somewhat higher range of 20-45 cases annually. COMPLIANCE 1974, supra note 78, at 4.
127. If each ALJ handled only one case per month, four ALJs would be sufficient
to handle a caseload projected from 1974 statistics.
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appeal and supported by specific rebuttal of the hearing examiner's
decision.128
Conclusion
Dunlop v. Bachowski is an important example of the functional, if
not theoretical, limits of judicial review. In extending review to Title
IV decisionmaking, the Bachowski Court overlooked two important
facts: judicial review itself may undermine the scheme of statutory
enforcement chosen by Congress, and a scope of review that is too
narrow may strip judicial scrutiny of its legitimizing and checking
functions. Judicial review is no panacea; the Bachowski line of cases
illustrates one area of law where judicial review is not desirable.
Yet Bachowski does call attention to an important private interest-
the union member's interest in the Secretary's Title IV suit-that had
previously been slighted by courts and the Labor Department. The
Court has initiated a court-agency dialogue that is groping towards
standards and, one would hope, procedures to protect the individual's
interest. But the most the Court can do is to pose the problem. The
ultimate solution must come from the Labor Department or Congress.
128. Cf. NLRB FELD MANUAL, supra note 77, §§ 10430-10438.4 (provision for
exceptions to trial examiner's opinion to be filed by any party involved in representa-
tion case "to enable the Board to determine specifically what issues of substance or
procedure it is being asked to decide").
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